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Should the European Union grant state aid through an institution like the European 
Investment bank? This paper evaluates the efficiency of different measures for granting state 
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different types of subsidies with indirect subsidization through public banks. We find that, in 
a large parameter range, the politician prefers public banks to direct subsidies because they 
avoid windfall gains to entrepreneurs and they economize on screening costs. For similar 
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However, from a welfare perspective, a politician uses public banks inefficiently often. 
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Politicians want to promote certain investment project; but levying the necessary
taxes becomes increasingly expensive (European Economic Advisory Group, 2007).
Two examples highlight the recent debates about the best way to promote desired
projects. The ﬁrst example is the International Finance Corporation (IFC) which
ﬁnances in developing countries private sector projects that generate externalities.1
The Meltzer Report, which was commissioned by the US Congress, suggests merging
the IFC with the World Bank and recommends that the merged entity should no
longer provide loans but only give grants (Meltzer, 2000). The second example is
the State Aid Action Plan according to which the European Commission will allow
only those state aid measures of member states that are the most eﬃcient and the
least costly (Friederiszick, R¨ oller, and Verouden, 2007).
These discussions indicate how important eﬃciency considerations are for the choice
of a state aid measure. Up to now the academic literature does not provide recom-
mendations about which measures of state aid should be favored.2 Thus, this is the
ﬁrst paper that addresses the following questions. Suppose a politician wants to
grant state aid so as to have positive externalities realized. Which measure to grant
state aid allows a government to make the most of its expenditures? How do public
banks fare relative to other state aid measures? Do eﬃciency considerations justify
the existence of development banks such as the European Investment Bank (EIB)
or the IFC?
When answering these questions we have to take into account that, in reality, politi-
cians are not necessarily benevolent but may want to maximize their own rent,
for instance by increasing the probability of being reelected (Boycko, Shleifer, and
Vishny, 1996), or as a reward for speciﬁc favors.3 Therefore, we develop a theoreti-
cal model that captures the so-called political view by studying projects that yield
an externality to the politician. However, projects diﬀer in their creditworthiness.
Some are proﬁtable enough to be ﬁnanced by private banks. Others are only ﬁ-
nanced if they receive a high enough subsidy. For the politician, it pays to subsidize
only those that have a relatively high probability of success. However, the politician
does not have the necessary skills to assess the creditworthiness of an individual
1Currently, the IFC ﬁnances projects in the private sector in developing countries that have
“good prospects of being proﬁtable and beneﬁt the local economy” (IFC homepage) and thus
generate positive externalities.
2By state aid we mean all measures that (in expected terms) transfer state resources.
3Empirical evidence shows that the US government gives ﬁnancial favors to countries that hold
a rotating seat on the U.N. Security Council (Kuziemko and Werker, 2006).
2project. Only so-called credit specialists, who have access to a screening technology,
can determine the creditworthiness. Furthermore, subsidization of projects requires
taxation, and thus entails some distortion that reduces the politician’s utility.
We analyze and compare a number of diﬀerent measures of state aid. First, the
politician can employ a credit specialist at a public bank. Second, he can oﬀer an
(uninformed) subsidy to all ﬁrms that produce a rent. Third, the politician can
grant an (informed) subsidy by employing credit specialists as consultants. Based
on the resulting information, he picks out and subsidizes only those projects that
need a subsidy to become proﬁtable. Finally, the politician can create public ﬁrms.
We deﬁne a public bank as a bank that takes instructions from the politician, and in
return receives a subsidy from the politician. Thus, we take a functional approach
and do not base our analysis on the ownership structure of the bank. This needs
not necessarily be owned by the state. In reality, development banks resemble most
closely the public bank we model here.4
Our analysis yields four important results on the eﬃciency of state aid measures.
First, in the case of a public bank, the politician restricts competition for loans
to ﬁrms that have proﬁtable projects. If this were not the case, the public bank
would use subsidies to capture market shares from private banks and this would
result in a cost for the politician without yielding an additional beneﬁt. Second,
the politician prefers a public bank to an informed subsidy because this reduces
the amount of screening costs he has to bear. Using a public bank means that the
burden of screening ﬁrms that are not the targets of the politician’s intervention
is born by the private banks. In a large parameter range, the public bank even
welfare-dominates informed subsidies. Third, the public bank can dominate the
uninformed subsidy. This happens if the windfall gains that the most creditworthy
ﬁrms get because the politician cannot avoid their receiving the uninformed subsidy
are large relative to the screening costs of the public bank. Finally, the politician
uses the public bank ineﬃciently often. The reason is that the politician does not
take into account the duplication of screening costs.
Our paper contributes to the literature on public banks and state aid. The papers on
state aid evaluate state aid control by multilateral institutions such as the European
Commission (Collie, 2000; Dewatripont and Seabright, 2006). To the best of our
knowledge there are no papers that compare diﬀerent measures of state aid. This is
also not done in the literature on public banks.
4Commercial banks can also be state owned. Given our deﬁnition, however, they are not the
subject of this paper.
3The theoretical literature on public banks shows that they can foster economic
development (Hakenes and Schnabel, 2006). They also have positive eﬀects on the
ﬁnancial system by contributing to its stability (Allen and Gale, 2004; Andrianova,
Demetriades, and Shortland, 2007). It might happen that public banks operate with
a soft budget constraint because the government cannot commit to not reﬁnancing
poorly performing public banks (Kornai, 1980; Dewatripont and Maskin, 1995),
This relationship explains why government interventions often cause ineﬃciencies
and provides an argument for the result of a cross-country study which shows, that
in countries with higher government ownership of banks, both ﬁnancial development
and growth rates per capita are lower (La Porta, Lopez De Silanes, and Shleifer,
2002). However, no causal links are tested in this study.
Moreover, when evaluating the eﬀects of public banks one must be careful in choosing
the point of reference. We believe that a comparison between public and private
banks neglects the fact that the objectives of public banks are diﬀerent from those
of private banks. Therefore, such a comparison might be misleading. Suppose there
is a market failure that the politician needs to cure. The politician can use a public
bank to intervene but he cannot use a private bank. For this reason, we compare the
public bank with other measures of state aid. For all these measures, the politician
faces the challenge of committing to hard budget constraints in a dynamic context.
There is evidence that public banks operate as eﬃciently as their competitors (Al-
tunbas, Evans, and Molyneux, 2001). Our description of a public bank that is re-
stricted in competition ﬁts the concept of development banks fairly well.5 They play
an important role in providing state aid and are a means by which the politician can
pursue economic policy. The development banks in Germany, Japan, France and
Korea are operating particularly successfully (United Nations, 2005). The Japan
Development Bank (JDB) can serve as an example showing that directed lending
works. Its purpose was to ﬁnance the modernization of the Japanese economy after
World War II. The management of the JDB was politically independent and based
its decisions on the professional judgement of its loan department.6 As a matter
of fact, the JDB kept the level of loan losses much lower than the private ﬁnancial
sector (Vittas and Cho, 1995).
We choose to model a politician that pursues his own objectives. There are several
papers supporting this political view. The fact that, in election years, public banks
5In the only theoretical paper about development banks, Armend´ ariz de Aghion (1999) also
argues that interventions by development banks must be targeted.
6The World Bank provides recommendations for good corporate governance of state ﬁnancial
institutions (Scott, 2007).
4increase their lending more than private banks suggests that politicians try to in-
crease the probability of being re-elected (Din¸ c, 2005; Cole, 2006). Evidence from
Pakistan shows that politically connected ﬁrms get larger loans from public banks
than unconnected ﬁrms, pay lower interest rates and have higher default rates.7
Remarkably, about 25 per cent of the loans from public banks are granted by banks
that explicitly have social objectives. Interestingly, these banks are not used to favor
politically connected ﬁrms (Khwaja and Mian, 2005). Moreover, after the deregula-
tion of the French banking sector that started in 1985, bank debt declined sharply,
especially for poorly performing ﬁrms which, as a consequence, were more likely to
exit (Bertrand, Schoar, and Thesmar, 2007). In line with this evidence, our model
argues that some entrepreneurs, although they create a rent for the politician, do not
receive ﬁnance from private banks but are ﬁnanced by public banks. Therefore, we
predict that after deregulation these poorly performing ﬁrms are no longer ﬁnanced.
All these studies clearly indicate that politicians use public banks to pursue their
own goals. These studies also point out the important role the electorate plays
in monitoring politicians by showing, for instance, that the rents granted by politi-
cians decrease if electoral participation increases (Sapienza, 2004; Khwaja and Mian,
2005; Cole, 2006). None of the studies, however, compares the costs of granting sub-
sidies through a public bank with other means of subsidization. We ﬁll this gap by
comparing the eﬃciency of diﬀerent means of subsidization under the political view.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the set-
up of the model. We describe diﬀerent measures to (directly or indirectly) subsidize
projects in section 3. In section 4, we compare these measures from the politician’s
perspective, and from a social welfare perspective. In section 5, we discuss the
results and conclude. Proofs are in the appendix.
2 The Model
Consider an economy with three groups of agents - entrepreneurs, credit specialists,
and a politician. All agents are risk neutral, and there is no discounting. Entrepre-
neurs want to undertake investment projects but do not have own funds and must
credit ﬁnance their projects. Since each entrepreneur has only one project, we use
the expressions project and entrepreneur interchangeably.
There are three types of entrepreneurs of mass m1, m2 and m3,w i t hm1 + m2 +
m3 = 1. Each of them has a project that requires an investment of I and that leads
7It thus seems that politicians exercise inﬂuence on bank employees in order to grant favors to
connected ﬁrms.
5t oar e t u r no fY with probability p1, p2 and p3 (depending on the type, stochastically
independent, with p1 >p 2 >p 3), otherwise it returns 0. Hence, diﬀerent projects
have diﬀerent degrees of creditworthiness. Type 1 projects are called excellent;t y p e
2 projects are called medium; type 3 projects are called bad. We will give conditions
on the success probability later in this section. We assume that only entrepreneurs
know their own type; investors, credit specialists and politicians do not know the
type of an entrepreneur.
A credit specialist carries out a credit analysis before granting a loan. He spends
eﬀort c to ﬁnd out the success probability p of a project because ﬁnancing without
conducting a creditworthiness test yields an expected loss, i.e., (m1 p1 + m2 p2 +
m3 p3)Y< (m1 +m2+m3)I. The (result of ? the) credit analysis is not observable
and it is noisy. With probability 1−ε, the bank receives an informative signal, with
probability ε, it gets a random signal, distributed like the types of entrepreneurs.
Hence, the signal is “excellent” with probability m1, “good” with probability m2,
and “bad” with probability m3. Consequently, the probability of success of an
entrepreneur with an “excellent” rating is
P1 := (1 − ε)p1 + ε(m1p1 + m2 p2 + m3 p3), (1)
P2 and P3 are deﬁned analogously, Pi =( 1− ε)pi + ε

j mj pj.N o t et h a tP1 <p 1
and P3 >p 3. The assumption of a noisy screening technology implies that even bad
entrepreneurs apply for loans because if they – by mistake – receive a loan, they make
positive proﬁts. We use quotes to refer to entrepreneurs with an excellent rating
(“excellent”), but who not necessarily have excellent projects (and equivalently for
other types).
There is perfect competition between a ﬁnite number of credit specialists. We as-
sume that the screening signals of diﬀerent banks are perfectly correlated. This
assumption implies that rejected entrepreneurs do not apply again at another bank
if they know they will be rejected again - this is consistent with the evidence in
Shaﬀer (1998). We assume that all banks can raise funds at the same costs and
normalize these costs to zero.
In our model a politician maximizes his own utility. He gets a rent Xpol from suc-
cessful projects. The rent could be interpreted as the beneﬁt he gets from increasing
the probability of being reelected if a project is carried out and is successful. In or-
der to have projects realized, the politician can subsidize them. If he wants to grant
subsidies, he must collect taxes. Like in Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996), dpol is
the disutility that the politician suﬀers for each unit of tax he raises. The politician
wants to maximize his net utility, i.e., Xpol times the number of successful projects
6Figure 1: Time Structure
t =0• The politician chooses the type of measure and (if applicable) the
amount of subsidies.
• Credit specialists (banks) ﬁx their loan rates.
• Entrepreneurs can choose a credit specialist and apply for a loan.
• Credit specialists choose whether to analyze the projects. If they
analyze, they spend c and learn the probability of default.
• Credit specialists choose whether to grant loans at the proposed rate.
If they do, they reﬁnance from investors.
• Entrepreneurs who get a loan carry out their project.
t =1• Projects mature. If possible, debt is paid back.
that are carried out, net of the required taxation times dpol.8 The politician can
decide upon the type of subsidy before entrepreneurs apply for loans (see Figure 1).
It is important to note that the politician does not know the success probability of
the individual projects.
The projects can be ranked as follows: An excellent project has a success probability
p1 high enough for the project to be ﬁnanced without the help of the politician,
p1 Y> I +c/m1, taking into account the costs for screening. Both medium and bad
projects have a negative net present value (NPV), p2 Y< Iand p3 Y< I . However,
the probability of success of a medium project is higher than that of a bad project,
p3 <p 2. We assume that the politician increases his utility by subsidizing medium
projects, i.e., p2 Xpol >d pol(I − p2 Y ), but not by subsidizing bad projects, i.e.,
p3 Xpol <d pol(I − p3 Y ).
3 Measures of State Aid
In this section, we discuss diﬀerent types of measures that the politician may use to
subsidize projects in order to get the corresponding rents. Some of the project may
have positive eﬀects on social welfare; this eﬀect will be studied in section 4.2. We
study the measures proposed by the European Commission (1998), and start with
the least intervening one. The laissez faire case acts as a reference point.
8The study by Khwaja and Mian (2005) shows that the social costs of lending to politically
connected ﬁrms is high - the direct costs of politically connected lending are about 1.6 per cent
of GDP per year. In addition, the deadweight loss from levying these transfer payments from the
taxpayer are estimated to be about 0.15–0.30 per cent of the annual GDP.
73.1 Laissez Faire
Consider the case where the politician does not inﬂuence which projects are under-
taken and therefore does not need to collect taxes. Because the average NPV of a
project is negative, entrepreneurs will have to be screened in equilibrium. One insti-
tutional possibility is that credit specialists act as intermediaries between investors
(from whom they collect funds at zero cost) and entrepreneurs. They will screen
entrepreneurs, sorting out “medium” and “bad” ones. Hence, credit specialists en-
dogenously act as private bankers. In the appendix, we prove the following lemma,
elaborating on (technical) necessary conditions.
Lemma 1 (Laissez Faire) In equilibrium, all types of entrepreneurs apply for loans









The politician’s utility is
U
LF
pol = m1 P1 Xpol. (3)
In equilibrium, all entrepreneurs, even the bad and medium ones, apply for loans
at private banks. Bad and medium entrepreneurs anticipate that banks will give
them a blurred rating with probability ε, and hence give them a loan with positive
probability. Without screening costs, the gross loan rate (consisting of the repay-
ment of the principal and the markup for default risk) would be I/P1.N o t e t h a t
this rate is higher than I/p1, because the bank acknowledges that it misjudges the
entrepreneur’s creditworthiness with some probability. In order to break even, the
bank’s lending rate must cover the whole screening costs. Because a fraction m1 of
applicants is accepted, banks must add c/(m1 P1) to the gross loan rate.
The politician’s utility function (3) is determined by the utility Xpol he derives from
each successful project. The fraction of projects that is ﬁnanced is m1, the fraction
of successful projects is m1 P1. Among the projects rated as “excellent”, not only
will the excellent projects be successful with probability p1, but also some medium
projects (that receive a loan by mistake) with probability p2 and some bad projects
with probability p3. Of course, in the laissez faire case, no taxation is needed.
83.2 Uninformed Subsidies
From the politician’s point of view, one drawback of laissez faire obviously is that
medium projects are not implemented, and the corresponding externalities do not
accrue. One natural way of guaranteeing the implementation of medium projects is
to grant a direct subsidy. The subsidy can take the form of a guarantee, meaning
that the politician promises to repay the loan if the entrepreneur fails. However,
the politician cannot directly use the information generated by credit specialists. Of
course, to subsidize projects, the politician will have to levy taxes.
Lemma 2 (Uninformed Subsidy) The politician grants a limited deﬁcit guaran-
tee to entrepreneurs by committing to a subsidy of
S
US =
I − P2 Y
1 − P2
(4)
to all entrepreneurs that produce but are not successful. In equilibrium, all types of
entrepreneurs apply for loans at private banks. Those entrepreneurs who are rated
“excellent” and “medium” get a loan at rate
R1 =







I − (1 − P2)SUS
P2
= Y, (6)







mi Pi Xpol − dpolmi (1 − Pi)S
US
. (7)
In equilibrium, the politician grants a subsidy that is just high enough to guarantee
the implementation of “medium” projects. Not only “medium” but also “excellent”
entrepreneurs take the subsidy and, as a result, “excellent” entrepreneurs receive
windfall gains. For “bad” entrepreneurs, the subsidy is insuﬃcient to allow private
ﬁnance. Hence without a project, they will not get subsidies in the ﬁrst place.
Naturally, the politician does not want to waste tax revenues, he wants to minimize
these windfall gains. He can do this by making the subsidy contingent on observable
variables. If he pays a subsidy only in the case of an entrepreneur’s default (in which
case the subsidy is in fact a guarantee, potentially partial), then the expected subsidy
to an “excellent” entrepreneur is lower than that to a “medium” entrepreneur—the
politician saves tax revenues.9
9In our model, there is no moral hazard problem, entrepreneurs cannot inﬂuence their success
probability. In the presence of moral hazard, a deﬁcit guarantee might no longer be the optimal
form of an uninformed subsidy.
9The size of the (expected) subsidy depends on the loan rate, which is endogenous.
Projects cannot repay more than Y in the case of success. Since the resulting
expected repayment is too low for the bank to recover I, the missing amount has
to be covered by a guarantee. Of course, if interest rates are high, the politician
must pay a higher subsidy. Interest rates are determined by price competition
between banks. Relative to “medium” entrepreneurs, “excellent” entrepreneurs pay
a lower interest rate because they have a lower default risk. However, “excellent”
entrepreneurs must bear all screening costs, due to a selection mechanism. Assume
that one of the banks demands exceptionally low loan rates from their “excellent”
borrowers and commits to oﬀering loans to “excellent” borrowers only. Then this
bank would attract not only all excellent projects but also bad and medium ones.
The latter groups also apply because, with lower loans rates, their expected proﬁt
increases. All ﬁrms would have to be screened. As a consequence, the costs of
screening are born by “excellent” borrowers. Since “medium” entrepreneurs cannot
repay more than Y , the size of the subsidy equals the (negative) NPV, I − P2 Y ,
also plus a markup for the default risk because it is paid only in the case of default.
For the politician’s utility, note that, due to the subsidy, not only the “excellent”
but also the “medium” projects are implemented. However, the subsidy is also paid
to both “excellent” and “medium” entrepreneurs.
3.3 Public Banks
Let us deﬁne a public bank as a bank that gets instructions from the politician,
and in return receives a subsidy from the politician. As a bank, it employs credit
specialists (public bankers) in order to screen projects. In fact, we identify the credit
specialist with the public bank. Public bankers are assumed to pursue their own
interest, given the constraints created by the politician’s instructions.
All instructions for the public banker need to be based on variables that are observ-
able by the politician. For example, he can set a loan rate ﬂoor; public banks must
then grant loans at rates that are above some threshold level, or above the rate of
their private competitors. However, he cannot instruct bankers to grant loans only
to “medium” entrepreneurs.
Lemma 3 (Public Bank) The politician will subsidize the public banks with
S
PB = I + c − P2 Y (8)
per loan. Furthermore, he will restrict competition between the public and the pri-
vate sector, e.g., by forbidding the public bank to match a private banks’ loan rate.
10In equilibrium, all types of entrepreneurs apply for loans at private banks. Those
entrepreneurs that are rated “excellent” receive an oﬀer from a private bank. Those








and R2 = Y. (9)











All entrepreneurs apply for loans at the private banks because they oﬀer favorable
interest rates for entrepreneurs with “excellent” rating. Therefore, the loan rate
is just like that in the laissez faire case. Entrepreneurs who are rejected from a
private bank because they are only “medium” apply at the public bank and here
they must pay the complete return Y from their project to the public bank. From
this return alone, the expected proﬁt of the public bank would still be negative.
Hence the politician must compensate the public banker for the expected loss per
loan, I −p2 Y . Furthermore, he must pay the public banker a wage for his screening
eﬀort, m2 c.
Importantly, the banker must not be allowed to compete with private banks. The
reason is simple: if an entrepreneur gets a loan oﬀer from a private bank, this implies
that the help of the public bank is not needed. If the public bank really did undercut
the private bank and gave a (subsidized) loan to this entrepreneur, he would just
waste tax revenues. In the extreme case where the public bank always undercuts
private loan oﬀers, there is a complete crowding out of private ﬁnance by the public
sector, and the waste of tax revenues would be the same as with an uninformed
subsidy.
How independent of the politician´is the public bank? It does not belong to the
politician in the sense that the politician can claim the public bank’s proﬁts. The
public banker must keep the proﬁts for himself, otherwise he would not have any
incentives to screen. The politician must be able to give the public bank instructions,
but he cannot be the residual claimant of the public bank. However, the politician
needs some right to punish the public banker, e.g., to cut the subsidy, or to sack the
banker. When comparing public banks to uninformed subsidies, we get the following
result.






(I − P2 Y ). (11)
11In both cases, with the uninformed subsidy or with the public bank, projects with
an “excellent” or a “medium” rating are carried out. In neither case are projects
with a “bad” rating ﬁnanced. In both cases, the politician must subsidize “medium”
projects, to raise their NPV to at least zero. Hence the (possibly indirect) expected
subsidy to a “medium” entrepreneur is the same in both cases. However, the politi-
cian faces the following trade-oﬀ. On the one hand, he also grants uninformed
subsidies to “excellent” entrepreneurs who take the subsidy and experience a wind-
fall gain. On the other hand, he must remunerate his public banker for screening.
Hence, the politician prefers a public bank if screening costs are not too large.
3.4 Informed Subsidies
There is an obvious alternative to public banks in which the politician does not
directly interfere in the ﬁnancial system but still uses the information that credit
specialists can gather. In practice, proposals are submitted to the program man-
ager in a ministry and are pre-screened, short-listed and evaluated by a team of
experts on basis of their scientiﬁc and economic merits. Eventually, starting with
those projects with the best grades the projects are graded and projects are ﬁnanced
until the budget is exhausted (Giebe, Grebe, and Wolfstetter, 2006). In our model,
we capture the informed subsidy as follows: the politician can delegate the assess-
ment of creditworthiness to a credit specialist who gives a subsidy only to medium
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs apply ﬁrst for a subsidy, then for a loan from a pri-
vate bank. In this section, we will analyze how the politician can optimally get the
information from his consultant.
Lemma 4 (Informed Subsidies) A politician seeks advice from a consultant be-
fore subsidizing, if his consultant rates an entrepreneur as “medium”, he grants a
subsidy of
S
IS = I − P2Y. (12)
In equilibrium, entrepreneurs with “medium” or “excellent” ratings apply for loans




and R2 = I +( 1− P2)Y. (13)






mi Pi Xpol − dpolm2 S
IS − dpolc. (14)
12The politician will grant a subsidy of exactly I − P2 Y , lifting the expected proﬁt
for a “medium” entrepreneur to exactly zero, such that “medium” projects can
be ﬁnanced by private banks. Because entrepreneurs with a subsidy (and only
these) can credibly signal that they were rated as “medium” (because the screening
technologies of all credit specialists are identical), the private bank does not have to
screen them again. Therefore, screening costs c do not enter into the interest rates
for subsidized projects. For the same reason, entrepreneurs that get a “bad” rating
from the consultant will not apply for a private loan. Interestingly, the interest rate
for “medium” entrepreneurs depends on Y - the repayment to the bank is Y + SIS
in the case of success, and only SIS under failure. An increase in Y induces the
politician to reduce the subsidy, but not to the same degree. Hence, the maximum
payment to the bank, Y + S, depends positively on Y . When comparing public
banks to informed subsidies, we get the following result.
Proposition 2 The politician prefers public banks to informed subsidies.
If the politician pays the subsidy through a public bank, then, for the entrepre-
neur, getting the subsidy comes at the cost of paying a relatively high loan rate.
Consequently, excellent entrepreneurs do not apply for loans at public banks in the
ﬁrst place. This saves screening costs for the public bank, which are indirectly paid
for with tax revenues from the politician. If, as an alternative, the politician pays
the subsidy after screening applicants, excellent entrepreneurs have an incentive to
apply for the subsidy because, in expected terms, they make a windfall gain as the
credit specialist may make a mistake. Hence, all entrepreneurs apply for the subsidy,
and the politician must foot the bill by paying higher screening costs.
3.5 Public Firms
In many cases, politicians have projects carried out simply by public ﬁrms. Within
our framework, one could allow the politician to create his own ﬁrm. However,
because he does not have the ability to carry out projects, he would need to employ
entrepreneurs. To employ them, he needs to oﬀer them a wage. The politician can
choose to have large public ﬁrms with a continuum of entrepreneurs (such that the
law of large numbers applies within a ﬁrm), or to have many small ﬁrms (such that
the law of large number applies between ﬁrms). Each of these cases leads to identical
allocations, hence we consider only the ﬁrst case. Also, note that the politician does
not need to pay the complete investment of public ﬁrms with tax revenues. He
can take a loan from investors, and guarantee the repayment. That way, credit
13specialists (private banks) are not even needed as intermediaries between investors
and public ﬁrms. Loans from public ﬁrms are like treasury bonds - they do not need
to be screened and can directly be traded on the capital markets.
Lemma 5 (Public Firms) In equilibrium, the politician pays zero wages to his
employees. All entrepreneurs apply for loans at private banks. Entrepreneurs rated
as “medium” or “bad” are rejected; they become state employees. The aggregate tax
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Here, the aggregate subsidy equals the aggregate (negative) net present values of
“medium” and “bad” projects. The state guarantees for the repayment of the loans
of its ﬁrm, then competition between private banks guarantees that the value of these
guarantees equals exactly the gap in net present value. Because all types of projects
are carried out in equilibrium, the politician’s utility contains the externalities of all
three types.
4 Comparison of Measures of State Aid
4.1 The Politician’s Choice
Depending on the parameter constellations, the politician chooses the optimal state
aid measure. We illustrate the politician’s choice in Figure 2 for certain parameter
values and plot the optimal measure for the politician.10 Curves mark the borders
between the optimal types of aid. Clearly, the measure that the politician picks
depends on the parameters c and dpol. As stated in the above propositions, informed
subsidies are dominated by public banks, and uninformed subsidies are dominated
by public banks if c is not too large.
10For the plot, we ﬁx parameters at I =1 .0, Y =1 .3, p1 =0 .9, p2 =0 .7, p3 =0 .5, m1 =1 /2,
m2 = m3 =1 /4, ε small (we take the limiting case of ε → 0), and Xpol =0 .2.




Public Bank Uninformed Subsidy
Laissez Faire
For relatively high dpol, the costs of intervention are so high that the politician
prefers not to interfere at all (laissez faire). For very low dpol, the politician prefers
to have all projects ﬁnanced and hence uses public ﬁrms to carry out projects. That
way, he beneﬁts from the rent Xpol from “medium” projects, avoiding the screening
costs c, but has to accept that also “bad” projects are carried out. For medium
dpol and not too large c, the politician will choose a public bank. In this range, the
politician prefers a public bank to public ﬁrms because his costs of taxation dpol are
relatively high. This disadvantage is high enough to compensate the politician for
giving up the rent of “bad” projects, which are not undertaken under a public bank.
The politician prefers a public bank to laissez faire because the costs of raising taxes
are low enough to justify the realization of “medium” projects which would not be
undertaken in the laissez faire case. For medium dpol and larger c, the politician
will choose an uninformed subsidy. In this range, his utility is higher if he grants
subsidies to “excellent” entrepreneurs but economizes on bearing the screening costs
of the public bank.
Now suppose that for some reason public banks were not an option. In Figure 3,
we show how the politician’s choice changes. In the light gray region, the politician
opts for an informed subsidy which was dominated by the public bank before. The
regions in which the politician chooses laissez faire, uninformed subsidies, or public
ﬁrms have increased.
This exercise also allows us to study the argument, made by Shleifer and Vishny
(1994), that a politician reduces the number of interventions if the costs of an in-
tervention increase. Our analysis comes to a diﬀerent result. In the white regions,
the politician’s behavior is not aﬀected by whether or not he has access to a public
bank. For low dpol in the dark gray region, the politician implements public ﬁrms.
This means that now a mass of m2+m3 entrepreneurs enjoy being a public ﬁrm - the
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degree of state intervention increases. For medium dpol in the lightly shaded region,
the politician switches to an informed or uninformed subsidy - the mass of subsidized
entrepreneurs remains unchanged, but the cost of subsidization increases. Only for
relatively high dpol in the strongly shaded region, do we have the same result as
Shleifer and Vishny; instead of using a public bank for indirect subsidization, the
politician chooses laissez faire. Hence, how the degree of state intervention changes
if public banks are no longer available depends crucially on the alternative options
of the politician, on the characteristics of the project (Xpol, c, m, p and ε), and on
the politician’s costs of increasing taxes (dpol).
4.2 Social Welfare
In this section, we compute social welfare for the ﬁve diﬀerent measures of state
aid. In our current set-up of the model, projects lead to an externality on the
politician (the rent Xpol), but not on the public. Additionally, let us assume that
the implementation of a project also inﬂuences social welfare, leading to a social
externality of Xsoc.11 For Xsoc > 0, not only the politician but also the public beneﬁts
from a successful project. For Xsoc < 0, the project even has a negative eﬀect on
public welfare and medium projects should never be undertaken.12 Furthermore, we
must take into account that taxation leads to a social distortion that is proportional
11Without loss of generality, let us assume that the externality to the politician is also already
contained in Xsoc; otherwise, the aggregate social externality from a successful project would add
up to Xsoc + Xpol.
12If the negative externality is large, even the impact of an excellent projects on social welfare
can be negative. However, the measures we study here cannot be used to avoid excellent projects
being undertaken in this case.
16to the tax, dsoc. Note that, even for Xpol = Xsoc and dpol = dsoc, the politician does
not always pick the welfare-optimal subsidization measure. Social welfare takes into
account proﬁts and losses of third parties (e.g., private banks or entrepreneurs), but
the politician’s utility function does not.
Aggregate welfare under the social view consists of the NPV of projects including
the social externality, weighted by the mass of types ﬁnanced, net of the costs of
taxation, and the costs of screening.
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If Xsoc is not too small, a public bank can even welfare dominate the laissez faire
regime. However, if Xsoc is small, zero, or even negative, then laissez faire is the
optimal policy. This is obvious from comparing the welfare of the diﬀerent regimes.
For rather small dsoc, positive Xsoc and large c, it can be optimal to have public ﬁrms
even from a social perspective. The public wants the externality, taxation is not very
costly, and screening (even by public banks) is prohibitively costly. Comparing the
diﬀerent measures, we derive the following proposition.
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If there are more positive NPV projects in the economy than negative NPV projects
that the politician wants to implement (m1 >m 2), then condition (18) is satisﬁed
17for all dsoc ≥ 0. As with a politician who maximizes his own utility, the public bank
can welfare dominate both informed and uninformed subsidies. In comparison to
the uninformed subsidy, the public bank avoids the windfall gains to “excellent”
entrepreneurs. Thereby, the deadweight loss of taxation decreases. However, the
total screening costs with the public bank are higher because entrepreneurs rated as
“medium” apply twice (at the private bank and after the rating at the public bank).
As long as screening costs are not too high, the public bank is the more eﬃcient
measure for granting state aid also from a social welfare perspective.
Next, we compare informed subsidies and a public bank in terms of social welfare.
We ﬁnd that on the one hand the screening costs for “excellent” projects are dupli-
cated under the informed subsidy, and the costs of screening all entrepreneurs must
be ﬁnanced by tax revenues. On the other hand, with a public bank the screen-
ing costs of “medium” entrepreneurs are duplicated, but only the costs of screening
“medium” entrepreneurs through the public bank are ﬁnanced by taxes. Thus, for
high enough m1, social welfare is higher with a public bank. The higher the costs
of taxation, the lower the threshold value of m1 where the public bank becomes the
more favorable alternative.
Given the result of Proposition 3 we want to know whether the politician chooses to
use a public bank when it is the best choice from the point of view of social welfare.
We can prove the following result.
Proposition 4 The politician uses the public bank ineﬃciently often.
The explanation for the discrepancy is that the politician does not take into ac-
count screening costs and, in particular, the duplication of screening costs. For
him screening costs only matter if they have to be covered by the subsidy. When
comparing the threshold values where the politician switches from using the public
bank to using an uninformed subsidy to the threshold value where social welfare
changes, we can show that the threshold value is higher for the politician. The
reason is that the politician does not take into account that the screening costs for
“medium” entrepreneurs arise twice because he does not care about the costs of pri-
vate banks. Moreover, the politician always prefers the public bank to an informed
subsidy. However, as shown in Proposition 3, there exist parameter ranges where an
informed subsidy is more eﬃcient from a welfare perspective. (Note that the result
of Proposition 4 is independent of the size of dpol relative to dsoc.)
This section has made three points. First, and almost trivially so, laissez faire is
the ﬁrst best alternative if the social externality of projects is negative, Xsoc ≤ 0.
18Second, public banks can be welfare-optimal if Xsoc > 0. Third, in a large para-
meter range, public banks welfare-dominate both the informed and the uninformed
subsidies (Proposition 3). But politicians use public banks ineﬃciently often (Propo-
sition 4).13
5C o n c l u s i o n
We started this paper by asking what the most cost eﬃcient measures of state aid
are. In a globalized world it becomes even more important to use the most eﬃcient
means of subsidization. As some factors of production become more mobile, it
becomes more diﬃcult to tax them (European Economic Advisory Group, 2007).
As a result, immobile factors have to bear a higher tax burden and, thereby, the
deadweight loss of taxation increases. What do we suggest with respect to the reform
of the World Bank,14 or public banks in general, and the reform of state aid in the
EU?
Concerning the reform of state aid, empirical studies conﬁrm that state aid within
Europe is very much inﬂuenced by considerations of political economy (Neven and
R¨ oller, 2000).15 This evidence might suggests that, in reality, politicians maximize
their own utility. Of course, one fundamental way to deal with this problem would
be a thorough reform of the political system,16 which might be diﬃcult in the short
run. As a less radical alternative, one could restrict the measures of state aid that
13However, it is also conceivable that the public prefers laissez faire (because Xsoc is small), and
the politician switches from a public bank to laissez faire if public banks are banned (hence he is
in the densely shaded region of Figure 3).
14Although the World Bank is a multilateral development bank, considerations of political econ-
omy might play an important role. The results by Kuziemko and Werker (2006) suggest that the
United Stated try to inﬂuence the rotating members of the U.N. Security Council by providing
them more funds through U.N. agencies. Just like U.N. agencies, multilateral development banks
can potentially be used for promoting certain projects.
15In Neven and R¨ oller (2000), only a few political economy variables explain 90 percent of the
variation in state aid across the member states. This general result conﬁrms that the political
disutility dpol depends on the quality of the political system. Neven and R¨ oller’s study shows, for
instance, that federal structures and transparency of procedures help in limiting state aid. Thus,
there exist structural characteristics of the the political system which determine the amounts of
state aid.
16Studies on Pakistan and India point out that the role of the electorate in controlling politicians
has a signiﬁcant impact on the eﬀect that the state ownership of banks has on the economy. A
better democratic control should not only help to limit the abuse of public banks by politicians
but also to (for example) reduce corruption.
19a politician may use. The eﬀect of such a restriction depends on the characteristics
of the projects.
First, for projects that not only generate a rent for the politician but also a positive
externality on social welfare (implying that these projects should be undertaken)
the politician should be able to use the most eﬃcient means of intervention. In a
large parameter range this is the public bank. In this range, forbidding a public
bank would decrease social welfare. But we have also shown that the politician still
prefers a public bank to direct subsidies when the latter measure is more eﬃcient
(Proposition 4). Here, privatization would indeed improve social welfare.
Second, for projects that have a negative externality on social welfare, the laissez
faire case would be optimal from a welfare perspective. We have shown that the
policy implication is not clear cut in this case either. If the politician who maxi-
mizes his own utility can no longer use a public bank, he may either abstain from
interventions (which obviously increases social welfare) or use less eﬃcient means of
state aid (which decreases welfare even further).
The Meltzer report suggests replacing loans made by the World Bank group through
grants. Our model does not broadly support this suggestion but points out that
having a public bank is often the most eﬃcient measure for granting state aid.
Furthermore, the Meltzer report criticizes the World Bank for ﬁnancing projects
that are also viable on the capital market. Here the policy implication of our model
concurs with the Meltzer report. We emphasize in our analysis that a public bank
can dominate straight subsidies only if competition with private banks is restricted
(see Lemma 3). One potential way to design such a restriction is to not allow
public banks to match the loan rates of their private competitors. Such a restriction
guarantees that public banks grant loans only to entrepreneurs who do not have
access to the private banking sector rather than wasting tax money by interfering
in the private sector.
A Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 . Because banks make mistakes with positive probability, and
a loan application is not costly to entrepreneurs, all types of entrepreneurs will
apply for loans. Of all these applicants, a fraction m1 is excellent, hence the bank’s
reﬁnancing costs are m1 I. The entrepreneurs who get the loan are of mixed quality,
their probability of success is P1 as deﬁned in (1). The expected proﬁt for the bank
20is hence
Π=m1 P1 R1 − m1 I − c.
Due to the assumption of perfect competition, the expected proﬁt from a loan must
be zero. Solving for R1 yields (2).
Under what conditions does a banker reject entrepreneurs with a “medium” rating?
When the screening costs are already sunk, the expected proﬁt from a “medium”
entrepreneur is Π = m2 P2 R2−m2 I. The banker can demand a loan rate of at max
R2 = Y . A suﬃcient condition that bankers reject entrepreneurs with a “medium”
rating is thus P2 Y< I . For small ε, this inequality becomes p2 Y< I ,m e d i u m
projects must have a negative NPV. The expected return from entrepreneurs with a
“bad” rating is even lower, they will also be rejected under the above condition. In
order to have intermediated ﬁnance, the return from a screened loan must exceed
that from an unscreened loan, Π ≥ ¯ pY =[ m1 p1 + m2 p2 + m3 p3]Y .T h i st e r mi s
assumed to be negative, hence ﬁnance is always intermediated.
The politician derives utility Xpol from all successful projects. Projects that get
ﬁnance (mass m1) are successful with probability P1, hence the politician’s utility is
given by (3). For small ε, the politician’s utility is approximately m1 p1 Xpol. 
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 . We show that the politician cannot improve upon the sub-
sidy described in the lemma. The necessary subsidy depends on the loan rates for
diﬀerent entrepreneurs, so we have to determine these rates ﬁrst.
Step 1: Determine loan rates. Note that banks must make their interest rate
oﬀers contingent on the rating of the entrepreneur. If a bank oﬀered the same
loan rate for all classes of entrepreneurs, this rate would have to be relatively high,
hence especially entrepreneurs with “excellent” ratings would rather go to banks
with attractive loan oﬀers for “excellent” entrepreneurs. A bank that grants loans
to entrepreneurs with “excellent” and “medium” ratings at rates R1 and R2 makes









However, the interest rates for “excellent” projects R1 cannot be arbitrarily high.
For too high rates R1, banks that specialize on “excellent” projects could emerge
and attract excellent projects with a lower R1. Because banks err with positive
probability, medium and bad projects would also try to get a loan from these banks.
Hence, the expected proﬁt of such a bank (out of equilibrium) would be
Π1 = m1 (P1 R1 +( 1− P1)S
US − I) − c.
21If both Π1,2 =0a n dΠ 1 = 0, then the interest rates constitute an equilibrium; no
bank can improve proﬁts by adjusting its loan rates, and
R1 =







I − (1 − P2)SUS
P2
.
The politician must grant the “medium” entrepreneur a subsidy high enough to
make the application for a loan worthwhile. On the other hand, he wants to choose
SUS just high enough to raise the creditworthiness of “medium” entrepreneurs so
that they get access to private ﬁnance. This yields R2 ≥ Y , and in the limit R2 → Y .
Solving the three equations Π1,2 =0 ,Π 1 =0 ,a n dR2 = Y for R1, R2 and SUS,w e
get (4), (5) and (6).
Step 2: Derive the optimal kind of subsidy. With a subsidy as in (4), both
“medium” and “excellent” entrepreneurs will produce. With a subsidy lower than
in (4), “medium” entrepreneurs could not produce, because the loan rate demanded
by banks would exceed the highest repayment possible Y . As a consequence, pro-
duction decisions would be the same as without any subsidy. With a subsidy slightly
higher than (4), “medium” and “excellent” entrepreneurs would produce, but tax
revenues would be wasted because the same production decisions could be achieved
with a lower subsidy. With an even higher subsidy (for instance an unlimited deﬁcit
guarantee that covers the total repayment), even “bad” entrepreneurs would get
access to loans.
If the politician granted a subsidy unconditional on success, then the expected
amount of subsidy paid to “excellent” projects would be the same as that paid
to “medium” projects. In the case of a (partial) deﬁcit guarantee, the expected
subsidy paid to “excellent” projects is lower because their probability of success is
higher and that way the politician can economize on tax revenues. If the politi-
cian granted a subsidy unconditional on production, then all entrepreneurs would
take the subsidy as a windfall gain. Even “bad” entrepreneurs would take a sub-
sidy although they cannot produce because they do not get access to private loans.
This wastes tax revenues and creates a disutility to the politician. Summarizing, we
ﬁnd that, given the politician uses a subsidy to inﬂuence production decisions, the
method of lemma 2 is the most eﬃcient way of using tax revenues.
Finally, let us derive the politician’s utility from implementing a direct, uninformed
subsidy. Both medium and excellent projects are carried out and take the subsidy.
An aggregate tax of

m2 (1 − P2)+m1 (1 − P1)

SUS must be levied to ﬁnance the
subsidy. Hence, the politician’s utility is given by (7). 
22Proof of Lemma 3. Step 1: Determine loans rates. In equilibrium, private
banks will grant loans only to “excellent” projects, hence they will oﬀer the most
favorable loan rates. As a consequence, bad entrepreneurs will apply at a private
bank. If they are rejected because they are “bad”, they know that they will never
get a loan (because the screening technologies of all banks are identical) so they
will not apply again. “Medium” entrepreneurs will ﬁrst apply at a private bank as
well, to have the chance to beneﬁt from the favorable loan rates if they are rated
as “excellent.” After being rejected, they apply at a public bank which ﬁnances
“medium” projects since the expected loss it makes which each “medium” project
is compensated by a subsidy from the politician. Given the subsidy in (8), the
public banks demands R2 = Y we are exactly in the limiting case where medium
entrepreneurs only just participate.
“Excellent” entrepreneurs always apply for a loan at the private bank (the one with
the lowest rate). There is perfect competition between private banks for “excellent”
projects and this drives down their expected proﬁt to zero. Thus, the private bank’s
expected proﬁt is Π1 = m1 (P1 R1 − I) − c.N o wΠ 1 = 0 implies (9).
Step 2: Derive optimal subsidy. The maximum loan rate that a public bank can
demand is R2 = Y . In this case, the public bank’s proﬁt function is given by
Π
PB = m2 (P2 Y + S
PB − I) − m2 c. (19)
This term must be non negative, otherwise the public banker’s participation con-
straint would be violated. Choosing SPB as in (8), we ﬁnd that the participation
constraint just holds, the public banker’s expected proﬁts are zero.
The subsidy must not be higher than necessary to satisfy the public bankers’ par-
ticipation and incentive compatibility constraints, otherwise tax revenues would be
wasted.
Step 3: Restriction in competition is necessary. An important feature of the pub-
lic bank is that competition with private banks must be restricted, for example, by
not allowing public banks to oﬀer the same loan rates as private banks. If there were
unrestricted competition, the public bank could give loans to “excellent” entrepre-
neurs and still collect the subsidy. This would allow them to make positive proﬁts.
Consequently, public banks would grant loans to all “excellent” and “medium” en-
trepreneurs. The aggregate subsidy to the public bank would then be higher than
with direct subsidization of entrepreneurs, as in Section 3.2.
The politician derives utility from both “excellent” and “medium” projects. In equi-
librium, only “medium” entrepreneurs get the indirect subsidy through the public
bank. Hence, the politician’s utility is given by (10). 
23Proof of Proposition 1. Compare the politician’s utilities under the two sub-
sidization measures, UPB
pol and UUS
pol. Straightforward algebraic manipulation shows
that UPB
pol >U US
pol as long as (11) holds. 
Proof of Lemma 4. Step 1: Determine the loan rates. The politician grants a
subsidy to entrepreneurs rated as medium. They can use the subsidy to signal their
rating. The proﬁt of a private bank from a subsidized entrepreneur is
Π2 = m2





Under perfect competition, the loan rate will be
R2 =
I − (1 − P2)SIS
P2
.
Now, after entrepreneurs have received a subsidy and a loan, only entrepreneurs
rated as “excellent” by the credit specialist will apply for loans at private banks.
Entrepreneurs who were rated as “bad” will not apply because they know for sure




1 = m1 (P1 R1 − I) − m1 c,
hence, in market equilibrium the interest rate is R1 as in (9).
Step 2: Derive optimal subsidy. In order to analyze the size of the subsidy, we
need to ﬁnd out which entrepreneurs are screened by whom. All entrepreneurs will
apply for the subsidy, because they do not want to risk of being rejected by the bank
and then lose the chance to get the subsidy. As a result, the aggregate screening
cost of the consultants is at least c. It is also possible to ﬁnd a contract that
needs no more than c: Employ one consultant and let him screen all entrepreneurs,
employ another consultant and let him control a random fraction η, pay the ﬁrst
consultant only if the second ﬁnds no mistakes, and let η converge to zero. Based
on the ﬁrst consultant’s report, the politician grants subsidies only to “medium”
entrepreneurs. Now private banks can observe the subsidy, and hence can give
loans without further screening to these subsidized entrepreneurs (if the subsidy is
suﬃciently high). The politician can again set the subsidy such that the medium
entrepreneurs’ participation constraint binds. Setting R2 = Y + SIS,w eg e tSIS =
I − P2 Y .
The public consultants cannot be the owners of private banks, but must be inde-
pendent agents. The politician cannot allow his public consultant to give loans to
24entrepreneurs who get a subsidy: The public consultant would have – in terms of
information – a competitive advantage on the loan market compared to other private
banks. Therefore, he could always oﬀer a lower loan rate than the private bank and
make sure that he can grant the loan. Anticipating this, the public consultant could
tell the politician to subsidize even if an entrepreneur is already “excellent.” The
public consultant could proﬁt indirectly because of his competitive advantage. As a
consequence, both “excellent” and “medium” entrepreneurs would get the subsidy,
and the consultant’s advice would be worthless. Moreover, if the public consultant
gave the loan himself, the institutional setting might be indistinguishably close to a
public bank.
Now the politician’s utility comprises the following components. Projects are car-
ried out by “medium” and “excellent” entrepreneurs. The subsidy is paid only to
“medium” entrepreneurs. Furthermore, the politician must pay a wage of c per
screened loan to his advisors (credit specialists). Consequently, the aggregate utility
is (14). 
Proof of Proposition 2. We only need to compare UPB
pol from (10) with UIS
pol from
(14). Using straightforward algebra, we ﬁnd that UPB
pol always exceeds UIS
pol because
cd pol >m 2 cd pol for any strictly positive c and dpol. 
Proof of Lemma 5. All entrepreneurs apply at the bank, but “medium” and
“bad” entrepreneurs will be rejected. They apply at the politician to become a
public employee. When making wage oﬀers, the politician needs to take into account
the outside option that diﬀerent types of entrepreneurs have. Entrepreneurs rated
as “medium” have expected proﬁts of zero if they do not sell their project because
they cannot get loans from private banks. Consequently, the politician does not
need to oﬀer more than an inﬁnitesimal wage to employ entrepreneurs rated as
“medium.” In the limiting case, he can pay zero wages. However, at any weakly
positive wage, entrepreneurs rated as “bad” will apply as well. Only entrepreneurs
rated as “excellent” will choose to remain independent at a zero wage. However,
the politician does not aim to employ entrepreneurs rated as “excellent” in the ﬁrst
place – their projects are carried out without government intervention, because they
are sure to be ﬁnanced by private banks.
Although the politician does not need to pay for the projects, public ﬁrms do not
come free of cost. The politician needs to be liable for the debt of public ﬁrms,
otherwise investors would not grant loans. Because investors can observe that the
government guarantees the repayment, they do not need to screen public ﬁrms. They
25get the same repayment in the case of success or failure, independent of the quality
of the entrepreneurs within the ﬁrm. Therefore, they do not need a compensation
for risk, and every public ﬁrm has a loan rate of r =1 .
Hence, the politician’s expected payment for such bailouts is (m3 (1−p3)+m2 (1−
p2))I. However, the politician does not need to ﬁnance these payments completely
from taxes. He can use the revenues from the successful public ﬁrms, which amount
to (m3 p3 + m2 p2)(Y − I). Only the diﬀerence between the expected revenues and





mi (1 − pi)I − mi pi (Y − I),
which is equal to (15). Because entrepreneurs can still get a public job after a
rejection from a private bank, all entrepreneurs apply for loans, just like in the laissez
faire case. As a consequence, screening out “bad” and “medium” entrepreneurs is
just as costly for private banks, and the equilibrium loan rate is R1 =( I +c/m1)/P1
like in (2). 






dsocm1 (1 − P1)(I − P2 Y ) − cm 2 (1 − P2)(dsoc +1 )
1 − P2
,





soc = c(m1 + dsoc − dsoc m2 − m2),
which is positive if (18) holds. 
Proof of Proposition 4. Comparing the threshold values in Proposition 1 and
Proposition 3 shows that ¯ csoc/¯ cpol = dsoc/(1 + dsoc), hence ¯ cpol > ¯ csoc. 
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